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LAWYERS' IDENTITIES, CLIENT SELECTION
AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLE: THOUGHTS ON THE
SANCTIONING OF
JUDITH NATHANSON
BRUCE

K.

MILLER*

INTRODUCTION

We lawyers disagree. We are, after all, schooled for conten
tiousness, and many of us construct our professional identities pri
marily through adversarial advocacy. That this advocacy is
undertaken on behalf of clients and with the expectation of com
pensation does not always drain it of intensely personal meaning.
We frequently come to identify strongly with the interests of the
clients we represent. For those of us who specialize, in criminal de
fense, say, or in civil rights litigation, these interests can transcend
the issues presented by any given matter for which we are retained,
becoming both institutional and ideological. The frequency of jour
nalists' solicitation of lawyers' views on issues of public concern is a
result of this identification. Our opinions are sought less because
we are lawyers than because of the political perspective we are
(usually correctly) assumed to represent by virtue of the kind of
lawyering we do.
For some of us, this confluence of professional identity and
personal belief is as much a cause as a consequence of the careers
we pursue. If we entered law school after, say, 1960, it is likely that
our decision to do so was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
do justice as we saw it. Lawyers such as Ruth Ginsburg, Thurgood
Marshall and Leonard Weinglass, to name three eminent examples,
were mentors to many of us, even if we never met them. And,
though educational loans, the job market, and the twenty-eight
years since Earl Warren's retirement have made compromisers of
* Professor of law, Western New England College School of Law. Many Thanks
to the editors of the Western New England Law Review for organizing this symposium
and especially to Seth Wilson for his commitment to seeing the project through.
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us all, it is fair to say that lawyers actively pursuing their own sense
of justice have significantly shaped the positive law under which we
live today. Nowhere is this influence more significant than in the
widespread popular endorsement, reflected in statutory enactment,
of the legitimacy of public efforts to eliminate many types of formal,
status-based discrimination by both government and private com
mercial enterprises.
I.

WHEN PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY CONFLICTS WITH THE
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE

Typical of such efforts is the Massachusetts' Public Accommo
dations Statute,l which prohibits many types of status discrimina
tion in "any place[] of public accommodation." The Statute
defines a place of public accommodation as "any place ... which is
open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general pub
lic,"2 and includes sex among the classes of prohibited discrimina
tion. 3 It would probably not surprise many of the lawyers who
urged this deployment of state power to enforce the antidiscrimina
tion principle to learn that their own law offices are considered
places of public accommodation and that their decisions to refuse
potential clients' requests for representation would fall within the
Statute's purview. There is, nonetheless, some irony in Judith Na
thanson's becoming the first Massachusetts lawyer to be sanctioned
by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
("MCAD") for vioiating the antidiscrimination principle in her se
·
.
lection of clients. 4
Nathanson is a feminist, committed to using her lawyering
skills to serve justice as she sees it. In her case, this commitment
means that she seeks to "devote her expertise to eliminating gender
bias in the court system."5 It is highly likely that Nathanson's par
ticular blending of personal belief and professional identity makes
her a strong supporter of the Massachusetts; Public Accommoda
tion Statute, at least as it applies to sex discrimination, and proba
bly with respect to the other forms of discrimination proscribed by
the Statute as well. The irony is that it is precisely Nathanson's
devotion to the eradication of gender bias that has triggered the
1.

2.
3.
4.
1997).
5.

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1996).
/d. § 92A.
See id. § 98.
See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25,
Id. at 40.
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Commission's determination to sanction her. The Commission ob
jects to Nathanson's declaration, prompted by her political values,
that she is willing to represent only women in divorce cases. This
decision, according to a hearing officer of the Commission, consti
tutes unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of
the Public Accommodations Statute. 6
Nathanson's articulation of her reasons for limiting her divorce
practice to female clients offers a remarkable portrait of a lawyer
who has fused her personal values and professional skills with deep
integrity. In her testimony before the MCAD, she stated that in
matters which do not involve controversies between men and wo
men, she "has no ethical problem with representing men."7 In di
vorce cases, however, she believes that the "issues that arise in
representing wives ... differ from those involved in representing
husbands. By example, she noted that wives' attorneys emphasize
the value of homemaker services and the limited future earning po
tential of homemakers re-entering the work force, while husbands'
attorneys tend to minimize these issues."8 More fundamentally,
Nathanson further testified that she
needs to feel a personal commitment to her client's cause in or
der to function effectively as an advocate, and that in family law
she has only experienced this sense of personal commitment in
representing women. She testified that her female divorce clients
derive a specific benefit from her limited practice. They feel
comfortable sharing their anxieties and concerns with an advo
cate whom they trust to be wholeheartedly as well as intellectu
ally committed to their interests. Nathanson believes that her
practice of advancing arguments only on behalf of women en
hanced her credibility with judges she appeared before in the
family law courts. 9

If Nathanson's assessment of the impact of her choice is cor

rect, it is noteworthy that the choice is not only essential to her
personal integrity but that it also serves the most defining goal of
our profession, the effective representation of clients. Nathanson's
decision to represent only women in divorce cases can be seen as
analogous to that of a labor lawyer to represent only unions (or
management) or of a personal injury lawyer to work only on the
6.
7.

See id. at 41.
Id. at 40.

8.
9.

/d.
[d.
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plaintiff's (or insurance defense) side. These latter divisions of pro
fessional labor are, of course, commonplace and un controversiaL
Still, the hearing officer's judgment that Nathanson's principle
for selecting divorce clients was unlawful reflects an understandable
reading of the Public Accommodations Statute. To draw distinc
tions between workers and employers or between injured people
and tortfeasors is not to engage in prohibited discrimination; to
draw them between men and women is, at least presumptively dis
criminatory. Further, as a partner in a law office that operates for
profit and both provides a service to and solicits business from the
general public, Nathanson appears to join most other lawyers (and
other professionals) in private practice as a proprietor of a "place of
public accommodation" within the Statute's meaning.1° Thus, un
less a law office should be viewed differently from the office of a
doctor or a dentist, thereby rendering lawyers "exempt from com
pliance with the anti-discrimination laws of the Commonwealth
with respect to selecting clients,"ll it is hard to avoid the hearing
officer's conclusion that Nathanson's refusal to accept male divorce
clients constitutes unlawful discrimination.

II.

JUDITH NATHANSON'S ASSOCIATIONAL VOICE

Leora Harpaz's thoughtful article on the Nathanson matter ar
gues that there are good reasons why a law office is different from
that of a doctor or a dentist. 12 These reasons may be found in the
First Amendment's protection of a lawyer's freedom of speech.
Professor Harpaz's basic point is that the heart of a lawyer's work,
advocacy on behalf of clients, is fully protected by the First Amend
mentP For this reason, state regulation of a lawyer's choice of cli
ents amounts to public conscription of that advocacy in violation of
the lawyer's right to control the message communicated by her
speech.14 Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's 1995 decision
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston,15 Professor Harpaz maintains that a lawyer's ideologically
motivated decision not to represent a client is exempt from scrutiny
under the antidiscrimination principle because compliance with the
10.

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (1996); Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 41.
Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 41.
12. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998).
13. See id. at 63.
14. See id. at 71.
11.

15.

515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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principle would force the lawyer to alter the ideological message
she wishes to communicate and because her advocacy, though com
pelled, might be publicly perceived as entailing her endorsement of
the altered message. Compulsion of this sort, Professor Harpaz
concludes, violates the lawyer's First Amendment right to speaker
autonomy.
If Professor Harpaz's position would provide a blanket First
Amendment exemption for all decisions by lawyers to engage in
otherwise prohibited discrimination in the selection of clients, it
may be overbroad. 16 After all, much of what lawyers do cannot be
described as public advocacy or even as work in preparation for
public advocacy. The speaker autonomy interests of a racist or sex
ist estate planning lawyer may be more analogous to those that
might be claimed by a similarly disposed accountant (or doctor or
dentist) than those of a courtroom advocate, and may warrant an
accordingly lesser degree of First Amendment protection. More
fundamentally, Professor Harpaz's emphasis on the Hurley deci
sion's protection of speaker autonomy interests elides the extent to
which even lawyers' public advocacy may legitimately be con
strained by the antidiscrimination principle just because it is already
conscripted-albeit by the market rather than by government.
In Hurley, the Supreme Court sustained the South Boston Al
lied War Veterans Council's claim to First Amendment protection
of its decision to exclude an organization of open gays and lesbians
from its annual St. Patrick's Day ParadeP As Professor Harpaz
shows, the Court rested on the "fundamental rule ... that a speaker
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."18 But
the South Boston Allied War Veterans' Council is an autonomous
speaker in a way that most lawyers engaged in the private practice
of law are not. The Council's choice of what public communication
to make through its sponsorship of the parade was, however nebu
lous in content, speech that grew exclusively out of the shared asso
ciational interests of its members.1 9 There is no suggestion in
Hurley that the Council's decisions about when, where, or what to
16. See Harpaz, supra note 12, at 51 (arguing that "the application of the state
Public Accommodation Statute to a lawyer's ideologically motivated decision not to
represent a client violates the First Amendment"). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Can a
Lawyer Insist on Clients of One Gender? NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at A21 (suggesting
that the First Amendment does not protect Nathanson's rejection of Male divorce cli
ents on the basis of sex).
17. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581.
18. Harpaz, supra note 12, at 52 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573).
19. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-74.
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communicate were ever offered for sale to members of the public.
Most lawyers, even politically committed lawyers like Judith Na
thanson, obviously cannot make this claim.
This distinction may justify application of the antidiscrimina
tion principle to the client selection decisions of many lawyers, even
though the First Amendment precludes its application to the Vet
eran's Council's selection of parade participants. First, it suggests
that a private lawyer whose advocacy on behalf of a particular client
is coerced by her compliance with the antidiscrimination principle
may not run a serious risk that the general public will perceive her
to endorse personally the positions she takes for the client. After
all, if lawyers' services are a market commodity, they are likely to
be seen as such by the public. If anything, the public may tend to
overestimate the extent to which lawyers operate purely as hired
guns with little personal attachment to the causes they advocate or
the clients they represent.
More controversially, speech whose content is itself the consid
eration in a commercial transaction merits less First Amendment
protection than speech emerging from other forms of personal asso
ciation. As Professor Harpaz implies, to the extent legal services
are seen as a commodity that is analogous, say, to a meal in a res
taurant,2° they become a more legitimate object of public regula
tion, at least when the purpose of the regulation is' to ensure that
the services are available to members of the public on a nondiscrim
inatory basis.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,21 decided in 1984, offers a persuasive description of
this distinction:
On the one hand, an association engaged exclusively in pro
tected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of both the
content of its message and the choice of its members. Protection
of the message itself is judged by the same standards as protec
tion of speech by an individual. Protection of the association's
right to define its membership derives from the recognition that
the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a
voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that
voice. . . . A ban on specific group voices on public affairs vio
lates the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment-that cit
izens, not government, control the content of public discussion.
20.
21.

See Harpaz, supra note 12, at 59.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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On the other hand, there is only minimal constitutional pro
tection of the freedom of commercial association. There are, of
course, some constitutional protections of commercial speech
speech intended and used to promote a commercial transaction
with the speaker. But the State is free to impose any rational
regulation on the commercial transaction itself. The Constitution
does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, sup
pliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial
transactions, without restraint from the State. A shopkeeper has
no constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex.22

Justice O'Connor's account of the disparate reasons for human
association captures the essence of the conflict between Judith Na
thanson and the Massachusetts' Public Accommodations Statute. If
Nathanson is a "shopkeeper" seeking exemption from rational state
regulation of her commercial transactions, her position is, of course,
meritless. But if her choice of clients is taken in pursuit of an ex
pressive association, if her divorce practice is the "creation of a
voice" with her female clients, then her exclusion of men from that
expressive association is indeed the definition of the voice she and
her clients are creating.
Nathanson's law practice plainly includes elements of the shop
keeper's calling. Like most other lawyers, and like doctors, den
tists, accountants, and restauranteurs, she provides a service to
members of the public for financial consideration in expectation of
earning a profit. But unlike many other lawyers and most, perhaps
all, doctors, dentists and restauranteurs, Nathanson, as a feminist
seeking "to devote her expertise to eliminating gender bias in the
court system," is, with the female clients she chooses to represent,
the author of a "specific group voice" entitled to the highest mea
sure of First Amendment protection. It is this commitment, grow
ing from the strength and clarity of Nathanson's fusion of personal
values and professional skills, that provides the strongest argument
for exempting her refusal to accept male divorce clients from sanc
tion under the Massachusetts Public Accommodation Statute.
As a practical matter, it may be objected, it is often impossible
to separate those lawyers who are "shopkeepers" from those who
aim to create, with their clients, an associational voice. But Judith
Nathanson's explanation of her reasons for refusing male divorce
clients suggests that this obstacle is not as insuperable as it might
first appear. Recall that Nathanson has no objection to represent
22. Id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ing men in matters which do not themselves involve controversies
between men and women. Her limited refusal to accept men as
clients is motivated as much by widely shared professional values as
by her own commitment to gender justice. If Nathanson is war
ranted in believing that excluding men as divorce clients enhances
her own commitment to her female clients, her clients' trust in her,
and her credibility with judges, then the exclusion is as integral to
her obligation to represent her clients as effectively as she can as it
is to her political commitment.
This direct relationship between Nathanson's refusal to repre
sent men in divorce cases and the vigorous, effective representation
of her women clients completes her argument for a First Amend
ment exemption from the antidiscrimination principle. The linkage
between the refusal and her professional role is what makes the
voice Nathanson seeks to create associative, belonging as much to
her clients as to herself. Moreover, the professional service Na
thanson provides to the women she represents in divorce cases is
advocacy of the very message forged by this associative voice. That
is why, in Justice O'Connor's terms, the right of the association be
tween Nathanson and her female clients "to define its membership"
is protected by the First Amendment.23 An estate planning or per
sonal injury lawyer with a discriminatory preference for white or
male clients could rarely, if ever, offer either of these justifications
for exercising that preference. Neither would a client be likely to
retain an estate or tort lawyer because that lawyer turned away
other potential clients of a different race or sex. Nor would the
lawyer's work for such a client ordinarily express or in any way de
pend on the prejudice that brought them together. 24

23. Id. at 633.
24. This does not mean that Nathanson's argument could never be asserted by a
lawyer whose choice of clients is motivated by racial, sexual, religious, or other forms of
bigotry. A bigoted lawyer's political commitments are fully protected by an indispensa
ble principle of First Amendment law: That the government may not discriminate
among citizens on the basis of the viewpoints they hold. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-96 (1992). But under the argument advanced here, such a law
yer may invoke the First Amendment as a shield against the application of the antidis
crimination principle only if his/her discrimination in selecting clients also enhances the
quality of the legal representation provided to the clients he/she does represent. For
example, a lawyer, if there is one, whose practice is devoted to furthering the perceived
common integrity of Aryan, Christian men could refuse representation to Blacks, Jews,
and women. A racist, sexist, anti-Semitic commercial litigator, however, could not.
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CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination might
justifiably apply the Public Accommodations Statute to the client
selection practices of some, perhaps many, lawyers. But it should
leave Judith Nathanson alone. Nathanson's decision to represent
only women in divorce cases is protected by the First Amendment,
not because she is entitled as a lawyer to indulge whatever biases
she chooses in her selection of clients, but because, as a lawyer of
integrity who has melded her personal values and professional skills
in service to the profession's best ideals, she is entitled to represent
her chosen clients as she sees fit.

